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Abstract 
Within the cognitive science of religion, some scholars hypothesize (1) that minimally 
counterintuitive (MCI) concepts enjoy a transmission advantage over both intuitive and highly 
counterintuitive concepts, (2) that religions concern counterintuitive agents, objects, or events, and 
(3) that the transmission advantage of MCI concepts makes them more likely to be found in the 
world’s religions than other kinds of concepts. We hypothesized that the memorability of many 
MCI supernatural concepts was due in large part to other characteristics they possess, such as their 
frequent and salient association with moral concerns and the alleviation of existential anxieties, 
and that without such characteristics they would fail to be memorable. We report the results of 
three experiments designed to test the relative contributions of minimal counterintuitiveness, moral 
valence, and existential anxiety to the memorability of supernatural ideas. We observed no main 
effects for minimal counterintuitiveness but did observe main effects for both moral valence and 
existential anxiety. We also found that these effects did not seem to stem from the greater 
visualizability of morally valenced concepts or concepts that concerned existential anxieties. These 
findings challenge important claims made by leading researchers regarding MCI concepts within 
the cognitive science of religion. 
Keywords: minimal counterintuitiveness, cognitive science of religion, moral 
valence, existential anxiety, memory, recall, Knobe effect 
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The Memorability of Supernatural Concepts: Effects of Minimal Counterintuitiveness, Moral 
Valence, and Existential Anxiety on Recall 
 
 A central area of research within the cognitive science of religion has focused on 
‘minimally counterintuitive concepts’—basic-level concepts that violate a small number of 
domain-level expectations. Examples include a dog that can talk or a statue that can weep. MCI 
concepts are to be contrasted with both intuitive concepts that include no domain-level expectation 
violations and highly counterintuitive concepts that involve multiple expectation violations—e.g., 
a dog that can talk, walk through walls, and be present in more than one place at the same time. 
Justin Barrett (2000, 2004b, 2008; Barrett & Nyhof, 2001) and Pascal Boyer (1994a, 1994b, 1995, 
2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2002, 2003; Boyer & Ramble, 2001) have argued that the concepts most 
likely to be found in the world’s religions are MCI because (i) religions concern counterintuitive 
agents, objects, or events and (ii) MCI concepts enjoy a transmission advantage over both intuitive 
and highly counterintuitive concepts.  
 The notion of counterintuitiveness to which Barrett, Boyer, and others appeal is a technical 
one that is defined in terms of basic-level concepts and domain-level concepts (Hirschfeld & 
Gelman, 1994; Boyer & Ramble, 2001). Domain-level concepts are the most general ontological 
categories to which objects are psychologically represented as belonging. The number of domain 
concepts is thought to be rather small. Boyer (2001, p. 78; 2003, p. 119) suggests they may only 
include the concepts animal, person, living thing, natural object (including things like rivers or 
mountains), plant, and artifact.  
 Basic concepts can be illustrated by considering the level of abstraction at which it is most 
natural to think about one’s pets. Does most of your thinking about Fido proceed in terms of Fido 
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being (a) a Labrador Retriever–Poodle mix with a little bit of Beagle, (b) a dog, (c) a canine, (d) a 
mammal, (e) a vertebrate, (f) an animal, (g) a living thing, or (h) a material entity? You probably 
think of Fido primarily as a dog. According to Eleanor Rosch and her collaborators (1976), 
conceptually basic categories are never found at the most concrete or the most general levels of 
abstraction and possess a variety of cognitively important characteristics that distinguish them 
from other levels of categorization. Basic concepts possess higher category cue validity than more 
general and less general concepts and are the most inclusive categories “for which a concrete image 
of the category as a whole can be formed, [are] the first categorizations made during perception of 
the environment, [are] the earliest categories sorted and earliest named by children, and [are] the 
categories most codable, most coded, and most necessary in language” (Rosch et al. 1976, p. 382). 
 According to Barrett and Boyer, a counterintuitive concept is a basic concept that violates 
a domain-level expectation. Boyer (2003) explains: 
Supernatural concepts are informed by very general assumptions from ‘domain concepts’ 
such as person, living thing, man-made object. A spirit is a special kind of person, a magic 
wand a special kind of artefact, a talking tree a special kind of plant. Such notions are 
salient and inferentially productive because they combine (i) specific features that violate 
some default expectations for the domain with (ii) expectations held by default as true of 
the entire domain. (p. 119) 
Not everything that is bizarre will count as counterintuitive in the relevant sense. For example, a 
dog that meows and purrs would not be counterintuitive, since meowing and purring violate basic-
level expectations rather than domain-level expectations. These behaviors would be unusual for 
Fido in virtue of the fact that Fido is a dog, not in virtue of the fact that Fido is an animal or a 
living thing. In contrast, a dog that never needs to eat would be counterintuitive.  
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 A concept is minimally counterintuitive rather than highly counterintuitive if it includes 
only one or two breaches of domain-level expectations. A highly counterintuitive dog concept (i.e., 
one that departs from standard expectations in a number of ways) would be one that “passes 
through solid objects, is made of metal parts, gives birth to chickens, experiences time backwards, 
can read minds, and vanishes whenever you look at it” (Barrett, 2007, p. 771).1 
 Barrett and Boyer contend that religion is typically defined in terms of belief in beings or 
entities with counterintuitive properties: 
What separates supernatural concepts from natural concepts is a violation of intuitive 
expectations for a given ontological category. (Barrett, 2000, p. 31) 
A cognitive science perspective offers a theoretically motivated working definition for a 
god: a counterintuitive agent that motivates actions—provided its existence is believed in. 
(Barrett, 2007, p. 772) 
[‘Religion’] is a convenient label that we use to put together all the ideas, actions, rules and 
objects that have to do with the existence and properties of superhuman agents such as 
God. (Boyer, 2001, p. 9) 
To sum up, religious concepts invariably include information that is counterintuitive 
relative to the category activated. (Boyer, 2001, p. 65) 
Barrett and Boyer thus claim that counterintuitiveness is a necessary and not merely a prototypical 
feature of supernatural or religious ideas.2 
                                                 
 1 Barrett and Boyer acknowledge that many religious theologies attribute a large number of counterintuitive 
characteristics to divine beings. However, Barrett and Boyer draw an important distinction between theology and 
everyday religion, noting that highly counterintuitive concepts are found only “in the rarefied intellectual atmosphere 
of literate theology” yet are “all but absent in popular, culturally widespread forms of supernatural imagination” 
(Boyer, 2001, p. 85). 
 2 Pyysiäinen, Lindeman, and Honkela (2003) echo this claim, contending that counterintuitiveness is “the 
hallmark of religiosity.” Atran and Norenzayan (2004, p. 714) concur, maintaining that religion involves “the 
culturally universal belief in beings who are imperceptible in principle, and who change the world via causes that are 
materially and logically inscrutable in principle.” 
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 The point of departure for research on the hypothesized transmission advantage of MCI 
concepts is Dan Sperber’s (1985, 1990, 1996) approach to the study of culture that he calls ‘the 
epidemiology of representations.’ According to Sperber, we can explain why some cultural ideas 
are more widespread than others by considering how human minds might be more likely to 
generate, transmit, and absorb those ideas. Just as some organisms have characteristics that make 
them more likely to survive and reproduce, some concepts appear to have characteristics that make 
them more likely to be remembered and transmitted to others. We can explain why ideas that are 
widespread take the particular forms they do by considering how universally shared cognitive 
processes or conceptual structures inform and constrain these ideas. Several researchers in the 
cognitive science of religion (e.g., Atran, 2002; Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Norenzayan & Atran, 
2004; Norenzayan et al., 2006; Barrett, 2000; Barrett, 2004b, 2008; Barrett & Nyhof, 2001; Boyer, 
1994a, 1994b, 1995, 2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2002, 2003; Boyer & Ramble, 2001) have used the 
framework proposed by Sperber to investigate the psychological constraints and dynamics of the 
spread of supernatural or religious ideas.3 
 Barrett and Boyer hypothesize that minimal counterintuitiveness constitutes a ‘cognitive 
optimum,’ since MCI concepts do not overburden conceptual systems like highly counterintuitive 
ones but (unlike ordinary concepts) are interesting and challenging enough to garner special 
attention. Barrett and Boyer have performed several studies that seem to support this hypothesis. 
For example, Boyer and Ramble (2001) found that MCI concepts were recalled better than intuitive 
concepts or bizarre concepts that involve basic-level expectation violations.4 Barrett and Nyhof 
                                                 
 3 Cf. the supplementary materials document associated with this paper for additional details on the 
epidemiological approach to culture, including how it differs from memetics. 
 4 Barrett and Boyer thus claim that their work on MCI concepts goes beyond existing work demonstrating a 
mnemonic advantage for bizarre ideas (Hirshman, 1988; Hirshman, Whelley, & Palij, 1989; Waddill & McDaniel, 
1998). 
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(2001) found that individuals recalled counterintuitive items from culturally unfamiliar folk stories 
better than intuitive items in the same stories and that MCI concepts were more likely to be present 
after three retellings of a story than either intuitive or bizarre concepts. They also observed that 
this recall advantage persisted after a three month delay.5 Banerjee, Haque, and Spelke (2013) 
report a similar finding with seven‐ to nine‐year‐old children, who recalled MCI concepts better 
than intuitive or highly counterintuitive story items (both immediately and after a one week delay). 
 A number of researchers, however, have reported experimental results that seem to 
challenge Barrett and Boyer’s claims about the mnemonic advantage of MCI concepts. Some of 
these challenges focus on the purported mnemonic advantage of MCI concepts over intuitive ones, 
while others focus on the role that ‘inferential potential’—the ability of a concept “to generate 
thoughts, predictions, memories, mental imagery and other personal inferences in the mind 
representing it” (Gregory & Barrett, 2009, 291)—to the memorability of MCI concepts. However, 
not all of these challenges hold up under careful scrutiny. 
 Scott Atran and Ara Norenzayan (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Norenzayan & Atran, 2004; 
Norenzayan et al., 2006), for example, report that two-word intuitive items were recalled better 
than two-word MCI items (both immediately and after a one week delay). Using many of the same 
test items as Atran and Norenzayan, Gonce et al. (2006) report that when MCI items were 
embedded in what they call ‘a relevant context,’ they were recalled better than intuitive concepts, 
but that when items were presented in a list format, intuitive items were recalled better. They 
conclude that MCI concepts enjoy a transmission advantage only in certain contexts. There are, 
however, a number of problems with these attempts by Atran and Norenzayan and Gonce et al. to 
                                                 
 5 Atran and Norenzayan (2004) and Norenzayan et al. (2006) also report that belief sets or narratives with a 
few MCI elements were recalled better than belief sets or narratives that contained only intuitive items or a large 
number of MCI items. Although theoretically significant, our focus will not be on the question of what mix of intuitive 
vs. MCI elements is optimal for the memorability of entire belief sets. 
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challenge previous research on MCI concepts. As Barrett (2004a) has pointed out, Atran and 
Norenzayan often fail to categorize items in accord with MCI theory and conflate the notions of 
counterintuitiveness, counterfactuality, category mistake, and contradiction. Barrett (2004, p. 732) 
also suggests that many of the items used by Atran and Norenzayan either “provide insufficient 
information to illicit any concept formation (e.g., ‘Solidifying Lady’),” or “may read as obtuse 
metaphors (e.g., ‘Cursing Horse,’ ‘Sobbing Oak’).” Because Gonce et al. (2006) borrowed many 
of Atran and Norenzayan’s research items, these problems affect their findings as well. An 
additional problem with Gonce et al.’s (2006, p. 521) research is that their claim “[w]hen relevant 
context was present, minimally counterintuitive concepts were recalled significantly better than 
intuitive concepts” is unwarranted by their own research. In none of their studies was there a 
statistically significant difference between the recall rates of MCI and intuitive concepts when 
context was provided.6 
 Another team of researchers, Porubanova et al. (2014), report that concepts that were not 
MCI but that involved the violation of learned, culturally-based expectations were recalled better 
initially (and recognized better after a one month delay) than MCI concepts. However, a number 
of the MCI items used in this study are quite difficult to comprehend. These include ‘democratic 
skunk,’ ‘liquid butcher,’ ‘evaporating rabbit,’ and ‘stalking table.’ We ran a follow-up study in 
which we asked 100 workers from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (average age = 37, 35% female, 
74% Caucasian) to rate how difficult (1 = Very difficult, 2 = Somewhat difficult, 3 = Neither easy 
nor difficult, 4 = Somewhat easy, 5 = Very easy) it was for them to understand the meaning of the 
items used in Porubanova et al.’s (2014) study.7 Participants rated the MCI items as considerably 
                                                 
 6 For additional details concerning our concerns about these studies, cf. the supplementary materials 
document. 
 7 Each participant had at least a 97% approval rate on at least 5000 MTurk tasks and was paid $.50 for their 
time. 
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more difficult to understand (M = 2.1) than culturally-based expectation violations (M = 3.6) or 
intuitive items (M = 4.6). A one-way ANOVA revealed these differences to be significant (F(2, 
2387) = 874.38, p < .001, partial eta squared = .42). Although the MCI test items found in any 
study might be thought to present interpretative difficulties due to their unusual nature, Boyer 
(1994b, 2001) and Barrett (2004b) have consistently characterized MCI concepts as ideas that 
violate only one or two domain-level expectations but maintain coherence with other default 
expectations. The fact that the items used by Porubanova et al. (2014) seem particularly difficult 
to comprehend leads us to be concerned that the differences in recall they report might be due in 
large measure to differences in the comprehensibility of their test items. 
 A second set of studies that have challenged the claims of MCI theory concern the role that 
inferential potential is supposed to play within the theory. Barrett, Boyer, and others who work on 
MCI theory introduce the idea of inferential potential by noting that simply being MCI is not 
enough for a concept to warrant any attention or to be of any religious concern. Consider the 
following items: 
(1) Invisible sofas (Barrett, 2000, p. 30) 
(2) Invisible rocks (Barrett, 2000, p. 32) 
(3) Animals that are made in factories (Barrett, 2004b, p. 25) 
(4) Rocks that vanish every time someone looks at them (Barrett, 2004b, p. 25) 
(5) Human limbs that are made of green cheese except when people examine them (Boyer, 
2001, p. 29) 
(6) A statue that disappears whenever we think about it (Boyer, 2001, p. 78) 
(7) An all-knowing but powerless divinity who cannot have any effect on what goes on in 
the world. (Boyer, 2001, ch. 2) 
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(8) The spirits of deceased ancestors who watch us, notice everything we do but forget 
everything they learn instantaneously (Boyer, 2001, ch. 2) 
(9) A shaman who can predict future events—but only about thirty seconds in advance 
(Boyer, 2001, ch. 2) 
(10) Giggling seaweed (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004) 
(11) Confused table (Norenzayan et al., 2006) 
(12) A potato with no spatial location (Gregory & Barrett, 2009) 
Each of these items is MCI, yet you will not find anything like them in the world’s religions. What 
are they missing?  
 Barrett and Boyer hypothesize that in order to be found in actual religious beliefs and 
practices, MCI concepts must also have what they call ‘good inferential potential.’ Barrett (2004b, 
p. 25) describes inferential potential as “the potential to explain, to predict, or to generate 
interesting stories surrounding them.” Boyer (2001) explains: 
Legends about Santa Claus or the Bogeyman are interesting, even arresting, but they do 
not seem to matter that much, while people’s notions of God seem to have direct and 
important effects on their lives. We generally call supernatural concepts “religious” when 
they have such important social effects, when rituals are performed that include these 
concepts, when people define their group identity in connection with them, when strong 
emotional states are associated with them, and so on. (p. 90) 
Even though proponents of MCI theory like Barrett and Boyer maintain that MCI concepts need 
to be coupled with other properties to have inferential potential, they contend that what gives MCI-
plus-inferential-potential concepts their transmission advantage is the MCI component rather than 
the other, added components. However, in the initial recall experiments performed by Barrett, 
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Boyer, and others, the contributions of “good inferential potential” and having “important social 
effects” were not controlled for.  
 Justins Gregory and Barrett (2009, 292) tried to control for the possible mnemonic effects 
of inferential potential in a study of MCI concepts by attempting to select stimuli with “relatively 
uniform inferential potential.” They chose test items on the basis of a pre-test in which 10 
participants were asked to indicate how thought-provoking the items were (on a five-point scale 
ranging from ‘very thought provoking’ to ‘not very thought provoking’), which Gregory and 
Barrett took to be a proxy measure for degree of inferential potential. Items from each category of 
interest (MCI, intuitive, true by definition, false by definition) whose mean inferential potential 
scores fell closest to the neutral midpoint were selected from a larger pool of items. Gregory and 
Barrett (2009) then observed that definitionally (or necessarily false) items such as ‘a triangle that 
is 4-sided’ were recalled better than MCI items and that stimuli with higher inferential potential 
were better recalled than stimuli with low inferential potential. They also observed no effect of 
minimal counterintuitiveness on immediate recall. These results appear to challenge claims made 
by proponents of MCI theory that the memorability of MCI items will in general be due to their 
minimal counterintuitiveness rather than to their inferential potential.  
 However, we have difficulty understanding how a procedure that aimed to control for 
inferential potential could result in nonsensical items such as ‘a triangle that is 4-sided,’ ‘a bachelor 
that is married,’ ‘a rainbow that is colourless,’ ‘a solid that is gaseous,’ ‘a vowel that is numerical,’ 
and ‘an infant that is elderly’ having roughly the same inferential potential—i.e., as much potential 
“to generate thoughts, predictions, memories, mental imagery and other personal inferences in the 
mind representing it” (Gregory & Barrett, 2009, 291)—as the MCI items ‘a fly that is immortal,’ 
‘a camel that is invisible,’ ‘a cup that is thinking,’ and ‘a cactus that is jumping.’ The analytically 
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false items are uninterpretable nonsense. Nonetheless, we applaud their aim to examine inferential 
potential more carefully and to attempt to control for it in experiments on MCI concepts.  
 Sources of inferential potential that have been explored by other researchers working on 
MCI theory include humor, agency, and familiarity (Purzycki, 2010; Porubanova et al., 2014; 
Gregory & Greenway, 2017a, 2017b). Benjamin Purzycki (2010), for example, found (both 
initially and after a one week delay) that humorous MCI concepts were recalled better than 
humorless MCI concepts and that humorless MCI concepts were not recalled any better than 
humorless intuitive concepts. This study raise questions about the ability of minimal 
counterintuitiveness alone to confer a mnemonic advantage.  
 An additional finding reported by Porubanova et al. (2014) that we did not mention above 
is that expectation-violating concepts that pertain to agents were observed to be recalled better 
than expectation-violating concepts that do not. However, Porubanova et al. (2014) classified all 
eight of the MCI plant and “object” test items in their study as non-agential, even though all of 
them are arguably agential. Their reasoning was that grapes, maple trees, tulips, birch trees, kettles, 
tables, trains, and chairs are not agents. However, the MCI versions of these items—viz., ‘barking 
grape,’ ‘jumping maple,’ ‘racing tulip,’ ‘vomiting birch,’ ‘hungry kettle,’ ‘stalking table,’ ‘talking 
train,’ and ‘worried chair’—appear to be agential. Agency seems uncontroversially required for 
racing, stalking, talking, and worrying, and it is plausibly also required for barking and jumping. 
Barking involves directing a signal toward an intended hearer. Jumping does not occur every time 
something leaves the ground; it occurs only when there is an intention to leave the ground. And 
even if vomiting and feeling hungry do not intrinsically involve agency, they are things that only 
agents are ever observed to do. These worries about coding apparently agential items as non-
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agential lead us to have concerns about what Porubanova et al.’s (2014) study tells us about the 
impact of agency (understood as a possible source of inferential potential) on memorability.  
 In a pair of studies performed in the UK and China, Justin Gregory and Tyler Greenway 
(2017a, 2017b) examined the effect of familiarity on the memorability of MCI concepts. While 
they failed to observe a main effect for counterintuitiveness on recall, they did observe a significant 
interaction effect between counterintuitiveness and familiarity.8 Across both samples in each 
study, they found that familiar MCI concepts were better recalled than unfamiliar MCI concepts. 
They also found that negative emotional valence, humor, and level of interest significantly 
predicted recall of test items. These findings raise questions about the claim that minimal 
counterintuitiveness is the central driver of memorability for religious or supernatural concepts, as 
compared to various sources of inferential potential.9 
 One cautionary note about Gregory and Greenway’s (2017a, 2017b) studies is that, among 
the eight test items that they coded as both familiar and MCI, it is not clear how ‘a wolf that is 
acting,’ ‘a balloon that is hovering,’ and ‘a Venus flytrap that is grabbing’ are MCI. While wolves 
certainly cannot perform in theatrical plays, they can engage in goal-directed behavior and thus 
can act in one very real sense of the term. Moreover, balloons float, and according to the Merriam-
Webster dictionary (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/float), ‘hover’ is a synonym of 
‘float.’ Moreover, a recent article on Venus flytraps describes them non-metaphorically as 
grabbing their prey (Tucker, 2010). The fact that these allegedly MCI items do not appear to be 
                                                 
 8 Gregory and Greenway (2017a, 2017b) also observed a significant interaction between counterintuitiveness 
and age, with younger participants recalling MCI items at higher rates than intuitive items. It is less clear whether and 
how this finding challenges the central claims of MCI theory. 
 9 Gregory and Greenway (2017a) contend that these results actually support the original formulations of 
Boyer’s (2001) hypotheses about minimal counterintuitiveness because his claims there were focused on the 
memorability of familiar MCI concepts rather than MCI concepts in general. 
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MCI creates a difficulty in understanding the particular nature of the challenge that the results of 
Gregory and Greenway (2017a, 2017b) pose for MCI theory. 
 In addition to the experimental challenges described above that have been raised against 
MCI theory, Purzycki and Willard (2016) have articulated a number of more theoretical challenges 
to the research program. We do not have space to rehearse their challenges in detail here, but they 
include questions about MCI theory’s lack of clarity concerning the ways that acquired information 
interacts with innate inferential systems to form mature representations of MCI concepts, the fact 
that MCI theory ignores much of the content of religious ideas because of its exclusive focus on 
counterintuitiveness, and the fact that MCI theory’s narrow focus on one feature of conceptual 
content leads it to neglect the important role that rituals and other social religious practices play in 
the acquisition, persistence, and spread of religious ideas.10 Our research is in the same vein as the 
second set of experimental work described above (Gregory & Barrett, 2009; Purzycki, 2010; 
Porubanova et al., 2014; Gregory & Greenway, 2017a, 2017b), which seeks to examine the relative 
contributions that minimal counterintuitiveness and inferential potential make to the memorability 
of MCI concepts. 
 We hypothesized that much of the memorability of memorable MCI concepts stemmed 
from the fact that they “generate interesting stories surrounding them” or have potentially 
“important social effects” and that without such characteristics they would fail to be memorable. 
More specifically, we hypothesized that MCI concepts that featured salient moral components or 
that concerned what Atran and Norenzayan (2004, p. 713) call ‘existential anxieties’—viz., death, 
                                                 
 10 Purzycki and Willard (2016) also criticize work on MCI theory for a lack of consistency in what minimal 
counterintuitiveness is taken to consist in. A primary way that Purzycki and Willard (2016, 226 et passim) make this 
point is by noting how differently MCI concepts are treated by Barrett and Boyer, on the one hand, and Atran and 
Norenzayan (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Norenzayan & Atran, 2004; Norenzayan et al., 2006) and Gonce et al. 
(2006), on the other. Instead of taking this to represent significant inconsistency within MCI theory, we view this as 
a situation where critics of MCI theory (Atran & Norenzayan and Gonce et al.) failed to aim their critiques as carefully 
as they should have. 
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deception, disease, catastrophe, pain, loneliness, want, and loss—would be more memorable than 
MCI concepts that did not. Moreover, we hypothesized that concepts that were morally valenced 
or concerned existential anxieties but were not MCI might be more memorable than MCI concepts 
that lacked these forms of inferential potential.  
 Our hypothesis concerning moral valence and memorability was based upon a number of 
considerations. First, we noticed that many of the MCI concepts used in existing studies that were 
serious candidates for religious or supernatural concern also had salient moral characteristics. For 
example, in research materials that feature a village statue that weeps, the statue is not described 
as weeping when the sun is high in the sky but when the people of the village have defiled 
themselves. Secondly, it seems that moral concerns are one of central kinds of thing that have the 
“important social effects” that Barrett and Boyer claim characterize memorable MCI concepts. 
Thirdly, religions often concern themselves with moral behavior. Boyer (2002) seems to assume 
that this is invariably the case when he writes: 
Supernatural agents are also represented as ‘interested parties’ in moral choices. This 
means that the gods or the ancestors are not indifferent to what people do, and this is why 
we must act in particular ways or refrain from certain courses of action. (p. 82) 
However, work in anthropology shows this claim to be too strong. While reviewing ethnographic 
research on small-scale societies, Norenzayan (2013) writes: 
A startling fact about the spirits and deities of foraging and hunter-gatherer societies is that 
most of them do not have wide moral concern…. The gods of hunter-gatherer bands vary 
in the degree of their involvement in human affairs, but typically are morally indifferent…. 
This tendency to assume that religions are universally concerned with morality is another 
THE MEMORABILITY OF SUPERNATURAL CONCEPTS  16 
 
blind spot that is the unintended result of seeing the world through a WEIRD lens. (pp. 7, 
195, 205) 
Nevertheless, religion and morality are often intertwined to such a degree that we hypothesized 
that the moral valence of both MCI and non-MCI items would contribute significantly toward their 
memorability. A fourth consideration stemmed from recent work in experimental philosophy that 
has shown that the moral valence of actions—i.e., whether they are good or whether bad or satisfy 
or violate salient norms—has a significant and pervasive impact on attributions of intentionality, 
belief, and knowledge (Alfano, Beebe & Robinson, 2012; Beebe, 2013; Beebe & Jensen, 2012; 
Knobe, 2003a, 2003b, 2010; Pettit & Knobe, 2009) and judgments about causation and probability 
(Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009; Dalbauer & Hergovich, 2013). If moral valence can affect these 
different kinds of judgments, we thought these considerations alone made it likely that moral 
valence would affect memorability as well. In light of all these considerations, we thus 
hypothesized that moral valence was a key driver of the memorability of a number cultural 
concepts in general and many memorable MCI or supernatural concepts in particular. 
 Our hypothesis concerning existential anxiety and memory was also based upon a number 
of considerations. One is simply that existential anxieties are matters of preeminent concern. A 
second consideration is that religions often depict supernatural agents as mastering or alleviating 
people’s existential anxieties (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004, p. 713). In addition, there are numerous 
findings showing that fitness-related information imparts a mnemonic advantage to concepts 
(Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008; Nairne, 2010, 2015; Nairne & Pandeirada, 2010, 2016; Nairne, 
Pandeirada & Fernandes, 2017). Since the existential anxieties that are of concern to many 
religions also relate to fitness, we expected the mnemonic advantage of fitness-related information 
to underwrite much of the memorability of many supernatural or religious concepts. Furthermore, 
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we thought that existential anxiety and morality were not unrelated, inasmuch as many of the 
competitive and cooperative interactions of concern to morality are typically also related to fitness 
or survival. 
 In the following sections, we report three studies that test the hypotheses articulated above. 
Study 1 examined the contribution of moral valence to memorability on its own and found that 
negatively valenced items were recalled better than positively valenced or neutral items and that 
positively valenced items were recalled better than neutral ones. Study 2 compared the relative 
contributions of moral valence and minimal counterintuitiveness to memorability and found a main 
effect for moral valence but not for minimal counterintuitiveness. Study 3 compared the 
contributions of existential anxiety and minimal counterintuitiveness to memorability and found a 
main effect for existential anxiety but not for minimal counterintuitiveness. Study 4 examined the 
ease with which individuals can form vivid mental images of the research items used in Studies 1 
through 3 and found that the observed differences in recall in these studies did not seem to be due 
to the greater visualizability of the more memorable items. Thus, we found that some of the 
characteristics of concepts that give them ‘good inferential potential’ predicted recall but that 
minimal counterintuitiveness alone did not. Our findings represent an important challenge to key 
theses regarding minimal counterintuitiveness that have been put forward by Barret, Boyer, and 
others in recent years within the cognitive science of religion, insofar as these scholars have 
claimed that it is minimal counterintuitiveness that is the central driver of the memorability of 
religious or supernatural concepts. 
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1. Study 1 
Study 1 was a recall experiment that tested the hypothesis that moral valence can affect recall. 
1.1. Methods 
1.1.1. Participants 
Participants were 54 students (average age = 19, 56% female, predominantly Caucasian) from a 
large, public university in the northeastern United States. They were given course credit for their 
participation. 
1.1.2. Materials and procedure 
Study 1 was patterned after one of the first experiments Barrett performed on MCI concepts 
(reported in Barrett & Nyhof, 2001). Barrett and Nyhof (2001) directed participants to read a story 
that described an ambassador’s visit to a museum on another planet. The museum had 18 exhibits, 
6 of which concerned various types of non-living physical objects, 6 that illustrated different kinds 
of plants and animals, and 6 that presented an assortment of intentional agents. The items in each 
exhibit were generally described with two sentences, the first containing information about the 
general ontological category under which each item fell, and a second sentence that described 
whether the item was MCI, bizarre, or intuitive. The stories that Barrett and Nyhof (2001) used 
had a very minimal narrative structure. There was a main character, a beginning, and an ending; 
but the various components of the story were not woven together in any traditional narrative 
fashion. This allowed items of one kind to be easily replaced by items of another kind and for them 
to appear in different orders.  
 Barrett and Nyhof (2001) asked one group of participants to read through one of the stories 
twice, and then after a two minute delay, to type out the story as best they could remember it. A 
second group of participants read the retellings of the first group of students, and then after a 
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similar delay, typed out everything they could remember from the retellings. A third generation of 
participants performed the same task using the second generation retellings. As noted above, 
Barrett and Nyhof (2001) found that MCI concepts were more likely to be present in the third 
generation retellings than either intuitive or highly counterintuitive concepts. 
 In Study 1, we followed the same procedures as Barrett and Nyhof (2001) but replaced 
their descriptions of bizarre and counterintuitive attributes with descriptions of morally good and 
morally bad attributes. The intuitive items for which Barrett and Nyhof provided descriptions in 
their article were left unchanged and were thus coded as morally neutral. Descriptions of 19 neutral 
items, 18 good items, and 17 bad items were distributed across 3 stories, each of which came in 3 
different orders. There were supposed to be 18 items of each type, but due to a transcription error, 
one bad item was misprinted as a neutral one. As we will see below, this mistake enhanced rather 
than undermined the central finding of the study. Below are two of the item sets used in Study 1. 
Item set 2: 
Neutral: The next exhibit concerned a being that can only remember a limited 
number of events or pieces of information. It always tried to remember 
events or information that pertained to its daily activities. 
Good: The next exhibit concerned a being that can only remember a limited number 
of events or pieces of information. It always tried to remember events or 
information that might help keep other beings safe.  
Bad: The next exhibit concerned a being that can only remember a limited number 
of events or pieces of information. It always tried to remember events or 
information that it could use to manipulate and exploit other beings.  
  
THE MEMORABILITY OF SUPERNATURAL CONCEPTS  20 
 
Item set 3: 
Neutral: I continued through the dimly lit hall and came to an exhibit about a being 
that can see or hear things that are not too far away. For example, it could 
make out the letters on a page in a book if it is no more than eight feet away, 
provided its line of sight was not obstructed.  
Good: I continued through the dimly lit hall and came to an exhibit about a being 
that can see or hear things that are not too far away. Whenever it wanted to 
help another being, it always made sure to stay within about eight feet of 
the being so that it could always see it clearly.  
Bad: I continued through the dimly lit hall and came to an exhibit about a being that 
can see or hear things that are not too far away. Whenever it wanted to steal 
something, it always made sure to stay within about eight feet of the object 
so that it could see it clearly before stealing it.  
A complete list of test items and details about the narrative frame can be found in the 
supplementary materials document that accompanies this article.  
 Participants were divided equally across three generations of story retellers. Participants 
sat at a computer workstation and read one of the three stories twice. They were not told in advance 
that they would be asked to perform a recall task. After a brief delay during which they filled out 
demographic information on the computer, participants were instructed to type out the story they 
read as best they remembered it. Second-generation participants came to the same computer lab at 
a later time, and each of them read two first-generation retellings of one of the stories. They were 
told that these were two versions of the same story. After a brief delay, these participants were also 
instructed to type out as much of the story as they remember. Each third-generation participant 
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read two second-generation retellings and performed the same task. Without telling participants 
that they would be contacted again, all participants were contacted via email two months after the 
experiment and were offered $5 if they replied to the email indicating what they remembered from 
the story. Not enough participants replied after the two month delay to have sufficient data for 
analysis at this stage. 
 Two hypothesis-blind coders categorized participant retellings according to which original 
story items were recorded in some identifiable form and whether they were correctly described as 
neutral, good, or bad. Inter-rater reliability was greater than 95%. Disagreements were resolved 
through discussion. 
1.2. Results 
The numbers of neutral, good, and bad story items recalled by participants across three generations 
of retelling are represented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Neutral, good, and bad story items recalled by participants in Study 1 
across three generations of retelling. 
 
Of the 248 recalled items, only 6 were recalled incorrectly in the sense that their valence was 
explicitly changed from what it was in the original story. The number of recalled items decreased 
from generation to generation, and the number of bad items that were recalled was greater than 
that of good or neutral items in each generation. Keep in mind that more bad items were 
remembered in spite of the fact that a typographical error led to there being fewer bad items and 
more neutral items to begin with. 
 In order to test for main effects for the generation and valence variables, two chi-squared 
goodness-of-fit tests were conducted. Both were significant, with medium effect sizes (generation: 
2(2, N = 248) = 27.98, p < .001, Cramér’s V = .34; valence: 2(2, N = 248) = 27.15, p < .001, 
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Cramér’s V = .34).11 In other words, the differences between the number of recalled items from 
generation to generation were significant; and the differences between the number of neutral, good, 
and bad items were also significant. A chi-squared test of independence, which tested for an 
interaction between generation and valence, failed to be significant (2(4, N = 248) = 1.41, p = 
.84). In other words, the effect of generation did not depend upon whether the items in question 
were neutral, good, or bad; and the effect of valence did not depend upon which generation we 
were dealing with. 
1.3. Discussion 
Study 1 demonstrates that the moral valence of concepts can significantly affect their 
memorability. Since the effect that the valence of actions has upon mental state attributions to 
those who perform those actions has been called ‘the Knobe effect’ (after the work of Knobe, 
2003a, 2003b, 2010; Pettit & Knobe, 2009), we might consider the present finding to be a Knobe 
effect for memorability. Within the Knobe effect literature, badness has been observed to have a 
stronger and more pervasive influence than goodness on folk psychological judgments. Our 
findings are consistent with this pattern. 
 
2. Study 2 
Study 2 compared the relative contributions or influence of moral valence and minimal 
counterintuitiveness on recall. We found that the moral valence of test items but not their minimal 
counterintuitiveness predicted recall. 
                                                 
 11 The second goodness-of-fit test compared observed frequencies with equal expected frequencies, even 
though the numbers of original neutral, good, and bad items were unequal. The reason was that performing the chi-
squared test on observed frequencies divided by their original numbers resulted in expected values of less than five, 
which violates an essential assumption of chi-squared tests. Because the test we report assumed equal original 
frequencies, it was thus more conservative than it needed to be and yet still returned a significant effect. 
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2.1. Methods 
2.1.1. Participants  
Participants were 105 undergraduates (average age = 19, 60% female, predominantly Caucasian) 
from a small, private university in the northeastern United States. They were neither paid nor given 
course credit for their participation. 
2.1.2. Materials and procedure 
Study 2 was patterned after another recall experiment conducted by Barrett and Nyhof (2001). 
Barrett and Nyhof noted that the study that serves as the pattern for our Study 1 did not employ 
basic level categories, although it did involve domain-level expectation violations. One reason for 
this was that the study was one of the first that Barrett performed on minimal counterintuitiveness, 
and he had not yet defined the concept as precisely as he did later. Therefore, in their next study, 
Barrett and Nyhof (2001) made sure to include basic categories. For our Study 2, we did the same. 
 Barrett and Nyhof (2001, pp. 83-84) also observed that the study that served as the template 
for Study 1 “used written stimuli while traditionally, stories and cultural concepts are transmitted 
orally” but that “[r]eal world transmission involves actual face to face interactions.” (Note that 
Barrett and Nyhof’s study was performed at the end of the twentieth century, before the age of 
social media domination.) Thus, for their next study, they used orally presented and transmitted 
stimuli. In Study 2, we did the same.  
 The narrative frame that was used for Study 2 described an anthropologist’s visit to a 
foreign culture. Ten sets of test items were used for Study 2. To simplify the variable of moral 
valence for this study, we only included items with a negative moral valence that involved the 
violation of a salient moral norm and items that did not involve the violation of any such norm. 
Within each set, there was one MCI item, one item that concerned the violation of a salient moral 
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norm, one that both was MCI and concerned norm violation, and one item that was neither MCI 
nor concerned norm violation. The aim was to have a total of 40 items, 10 in each of 4 categories. 
However, due to another transcription error, there were 10 MCI only items, 9 norm violation only 
items, 11 items that were both MCI and involved a norm violation, and 10 items that were neither 
MCI nor involved a norm violation. Fortunately, as we explain below, this error again only 
heightened rather than undermined the central finding of this study.  
 Below are two of the sets of test items that were used in Study 2: 
Item set 1: 
Neither MCI nor Norm violation: In the first village Smith visited, he met an old 
man that, it was rumored, owned more land than the king.  
MCI: In the first village Smith visited, he met an old man who, it was rumored, was 
able to live without food.  
Norm violation: In the first village Smith visited, he met an old man who, it was 
rumored, knew more about which tribal leaders were having affairs with 
other men’s wives than the king.  
MCI & Norm violation: In the first village Smith visited, he met an old man who, 
it was rumored, could see every immoral act being committed by someone 
on Vanafuto.  
Item set 4: 
Neither MCI nor Norm violation: In that same village Smith was introduced to the 
king who, during the great feast, gave food to the poor.  
MCI: In that same village Smith was introduced to the king who, during a great 
feast, gave away a special fruit that could cure any disease.  
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Norm violation: In that same village Smith was introduced to the king who, during 
a great feast, forced many of the poorest villagers to give up their prized 
livestock in order to provide food for the feast.  
MCI & Norm violation: In that same village Smith was introduced to the king who, 
during a great feast, forced many of the poorest villagers to give up their 
prized livestock in order to cook a special stew that could cure any disease.  
A complete list of test items and details about the narrative frame can be found in the 
supplementary materials document that accompanies this article.  
 The principal investigator took one-third of each class of undergraduates out into a hallway 
and told them the story of the anthropologist. Students were then instructed to enter the room and 
retell the story to at least two of their classmates. After every participant had been told the story, 
they were asked to provide their demographic information on a sheet of paper. Then they were 
instructed to write down everything they could remember from the story. Without telling 
participants that they would be contacted again, all participants were contacted via email two 
months after the experiment and were offered $5 if they replied to the email indicating what they 
remembered from the story. As in Study 1, not enough participants replied after the two month 
delay to have sufficient data for analysis at this stage. 
 Two hypothesis-blind coders categorized participant retellings of the story according to 
which original story items were recorded in some identifiable form and whether they were 
correctly described as neutral, MCI, norm violation, or both MCI and norm violation. Inter-rater 
reliability was greater than 95%, and disagreements were resolved through discussion. 
2.2. Results 
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The numbers of MCI, norm violation, both MCI and norm violation, and neither MCI nor norm 
violation story elements that were recalled by participants are represented in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Test items recalled by participants in Study 2, organized according to 
whether or not they included an MCI component or a norm violation. 
 
Although story elements that included both minimal counterintuitiveness and norm violation were 
remembered best of all, we failed to observe a statistically significant contribution from minimal 
counterintuitiveness to recall. As can be seen in Figure 2, the largest effect on recall came from 
the norm violation variable. In order to test for main effects for minimal counterintuitiveness and 
norm violation, two chi-squared goodness-of-fit tests were conducted. There was no significant 
main effect for minimal counterintuitiveness(2(1, N = 414) = 2.17, p =.14), but there was for norm 
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violation, with a medium effect size (2(1, N = 414) = 22.26, p < .001, Cramér’s V = .23).12 In 
other words, whether or not a test item was MCI had no significant effect on whether that item 
was remembered, but whether or not the item violated a salient moral norm did have such an effect. 
Keep in mind that while there were an even number of norm violation and non-norm violation 
items (20 each), there were by accident more MCI items (21) than non-MCI items (19)—yet an 
effect for minimal counterintuitiveness was still not observed.13 A chi-squared test of 
independence, which tested for an interaction between minimal counterintuitiveness and norm 
violation, failed to be significant (2(1, N = 414) = 2.17, p = .14). In other words, the effect that 
moral valence had upon recall did not depend upon whether or not the test items were MCI.  
2.3. Discussion 
The results of Study 2 run contrary to what the theories of Barrett and Boyer would predict and 
support our hypothesis that the inferential potential of cultural concepts used in the MCI research 
program is a central driver of their memorability  and that without inferential potential MCI 
concepts would not be memorable. Furthermore, the fact that MCI items that did not involve norm 
violation were not recalled at higher rates than items that did not involve either minimal 
counterintuitiveness or norm violation can be seen as a failure to replicate some previous findings 
that purported to show a transmission advantage for MCI concepts over intuitive concepts. 
 
  
                                                 
 12 The second test remains significant after controlling for multiple comparisons. The second goodness-of-fit 
test compared observed frequencies with equal expected frequencies, even though the numbers of original neutral, 
good, and bad items were unequal. The reason was that performing the chi-squared test on observed frequencies 
divided by their original numbers resulted in expected values of less than five, which violates an essential assumption 
of chi-squared tests. Because the test we report assumed equal original frequencies, it was thus more conservative than 
it needed to be and yet still returned a significant effect. 
 13 As in Study 1, the goodness-of-fit tests we performed compared observed frequencies with equal expected 
frequencies. Thus, the test for a main effect for minimal counterintuitiveness was again more forgiving than it needed 
to be, and yet we did not observe what Barrett and Boyer’s theorizing would lead us to expect. 
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3. Study 3 
After finding in Study 2 that one kind of inferential potential predicted recall better than minimal 
counterintuitiveness and because existential anxieties represent another important source of 
inferential potential that is commonly associated with supernatural concepts (Atran & Norenzayan, 
2004, p. 721), in Study 3 we compared the relative contributions of existential anxiety and minimal 
counterintuitiveness to recall.  
3.1. Methods 
3.1.1. Participants 
Participants were 83 undergraduates (average age = 19, 52% female, predominantly Caucasian) 
from a small, private university in the northeastern United States. They were neither paid nor given 
course credit for their participation. 
3.1.2. Materials and procedure 
Study 3 followed the same procedures as Study 2 but used materials that featured items that were 
either neutral, MCI, associated with existential anxieties, or both MCI and associated with 
existential anxieties. The following are two of the sets of test items from Study 3: 
Item set 1: 
Neutral: In the first village Smith visited he met an old man named Cluang who 
wept while Smith told him a sad story.  
MCI: In the first village Smith visited he encountered the wooden statue of Bonong 
that wept when Smith told it a sad story.  
Existential anxiety: In the first village Smith visited he met an old man named 
Cluang, who smiled while listening to Smith’s story about his narrow 
escape from death in a swamp filled with alligators.  
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MCI + Existential anxiety: In the first village Smith visited there was a wooden 
statue that smiled while listening to Smith’s story of his narrow escape from 
death in a swamp filled with alligators.  
Item set 2: 
Neutral: While Smith was walking to another village, he approached a bridge over 
a deep ravine when the chief who had been accompanying Smith said: 
“Don’t walk too slowly across the bridge. I’m hungry.” After Smith and the 
chief crossed the ravine, they entered the village and enjoyed a great feast.  
MCI: While Smith was walking to another village, he approached a bridge over a 
deep ravine when a voice from the sky said: “A great feast awaits you on 
the other side.” After Smith crossed the ravine, he entered the village and 
enjoyed a great feast.  
Existential anxiety: While Smith was walking to another village, he approached a 
bridge over a deep ravine and heard a voice in his heart say: “Don’t cross 
that bridge!” Two hours later, after Smith had crossed the ravine by another 
route, he discovered that the bridge had just collapsed, killing two travelers.  
MCI + Existential anxiety: While Smith was walking to another village, he 
approached a bridge over a deep ravine when a voice from the sky said: 
“Don’t cross that bridge!” Two hours later, after Smith had crossed the 
ravine by another route, he discovered that the bridge had just collapsed, 
killing two travelers.  
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The set of test items included 9 common items, 12 MCI items, 13 existential anxiety items, and 9 
items that featured both MCI and existential anxiety. A complete list of test items can be found in 
the supplementary materials document that accompanies this article. 
 As in Study 2, the principal investigator took one-third of each class of undergraduates out 
into a hallway to tell them a story about an anthropologist. These students then retold the story to 
at least two of their classmates, and all participants were instructed to write down everything they 
could remember from the story after a brief delay. 
3.2. Results 
Neutral items were recalled 52 times, MCI items 105 times, existential anxiety items 144 times, 
and items that involved both MCI and existential anxiety were recalled 111 times. Because the 
numbers of original items were uneven, ratios of the number of recalled items to the number of 
original items (rather than total items) in each category are plotted in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Ratios of number of recalled test items to number of original items in 
Study 3, organized according to whether or not they involved minimal 
counterintuitiveness or existential anxiety. 
 
In order to test for main effects for the MCI and existential anxiety variables, two chi-squared 
goodness-of-fit tests were conducted. No main effect for minimal counterintuitiveness was 
observed (2(1, N = 412) = .97, p = .32), but there was a main effect for existential anxiety, with a 
small effect size (2(1, N = 412) = 23.31, p < .001, Cramér’s V = .24). In other words, whether or 
not a test item was MCI had no significant effect on whether that item was remembered, but 
whether or not the item concerned existential anxieties did have such an effect. A chi-squared test 
of independence, which tested for an interaction between MCI and existential anxiety was 
significant, with a small effect size (2(1, N = 412) = 21.24, p < .001, Cramér’s V = .23). In other 
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words, the effect that existential anxiety had upon recall depended in part upon whether or not the 
test items were MCI.  
3.3. Discussion 
As in Study 2, MCI items were recalled at slightly higher rates than non-MCI items, but this 
difference failed to be statistically significant. Also as in Study 2, one kind of inferential potential 
(existential anxiety) identified by researchers working on minimal counterintuitiveness did have 
such an effect and was the primary driver of observed differences in recall. Again, these results do 
not comport well with the claims of Barrett and Boyer that minimal counterintuitiveness alone is 
responsible for the memorability of supernatural or religious concepts. 
 
4. Study 4 
Because existing research has shown that concepts that are higher in imagery are recalled at higher 
rates than concepts that are lower in imagery (Paivio, 1990), and because many of the test items 
used in Studies 1 through 3 differed in their visualizability, one might wonder whether the results 
of Studies 1 through 3 could be due in part to these differences in visualizability. Study 4 addressed 
this question.  
4.1. Methods 
4.1.1. Participants 
Participants were 420 workers from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (average age = 40, 48% female, 
predominantly Caucasian, all of whom had at least a 97% approval rate on at least 5,000 tasks), 
who were paid between $.35 and $.45 for providing ratings of a subset of the test items used in 
Studies 1 through 3. 
4.1.2. Materials and procedure 
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180 participants were each asked to assess the ease with which they can form vivid mental images 
of 9 of the test items used in Study 1. An additional 120 participants were each asked to complete 
the same task for 10 items from Study 2; and another 120 participants each evaluated 12 items 
from Study 3. Participants were asked to select one of the following five answer choices: Very 
difficult, Somewhat difficult, Neither easy nor difficult, Somewhat easy, and Very easy. For 
purposes of analysis, Very difficult was scored as 1, Somewhat difficult scored as 2, and so on.  
4.2. Results 
Mean vivid image ratings for the neutral, good, and bad items from Study 1 are represented in 
Figure 4. A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant difference in vivid image ratings across the 
three valence categories (F(2, 1607) = 42.39, p < .001, partial eta squared = .05). Participants 
indicated that it was easiest to form vivid mental images of neutral items and most difficult to form 
images of bad items. 
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Figure 4. Mean vivid image ratings for test items from Study 1, organized by 
valence. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Mean vivid image ratings for Neutral, MCI, Norm Violation, and MCI + Norm Violation items 
from Study 2 are depicted in Figure 5. A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for 
minimal counterintuitiveness (F(1, 1192) = 178.29, p < .001, partial eta squared = .13) but not for 
norm violation (F(1, 1192) = .83, p > .05). There was no significant interaction between these two 
variables (F(1, 1192) = 1.41, p > .05). Participants thus indicated that it was more difficult to form 
vivid mental images of MCI items than non-MCI items but that it was no more difficult to form 
images of norm violation items than items without norm violations. 
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Figure 5. Mean vivid image ratings for test items from Study 2, organized 
according to whether or not they were MCI or involved a norm violation. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Mean vivid image ratings for Neutral, MCI, Existential anxiety, and MCI + Existential anxiety 
items from Study 3 are depicted in Figure 6. A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect 
for minimal counterintuitiveness (F(1, 1342) = 91.40, p < .001, partial eta squared = .06) but not 
for existential anxiety (F(1, 1342) = .04, p > .05). There was also a rather small but significant 
interaction between these two variables (F(1, 1342) = 10.24, p < .01, partial eta squared = .01). 
Again, participants indicated that it was more difficult to form vivid mental images of MCI items 
than non-MCI items, but they indicated it was no more difficult to form vivid mental images of 
items that involved existential anxieties than items that did not. 
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Figure 6. Mean vivid image ratings for test items from Study 3, organized 
according to whether or not they were MCI or associated with existential anxiety. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
4.3. Discussion 
The vivid image ratings obtained in Study 4 tell against the hypothesis that the greater 
memorability of (negatively) valenced, norm violation, and existential anxiety test items was due 
to their greater visualizability. Although negatively valenced items in Study 1 were recalled better 
than positively valenced items, and positively valenced items were recalled better than neutral 
items, we found that negative items had lower visualizability ratings than positive items, and 
positive items had lower scores than neutral ones. Thus, negatively valenced items were recalled 
better in spite of their visualizability disadvantage. No difference in vivid imagery reports was 
observed between items that did or did not involve norm violations or between items that did or 
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did not involve existential anxieties, and yet norm violation and existential anxiety items were 
recalled better than matched items involving no norm violations or existential anxiety.  
 
General Discussion 
Some researchers within the cognitive science of religion such as Barrett and Boyer hypothesize 
(1) that MCI concepts enjoy a transmission advantage over both intuitive and highly 
counterintuitive concepts, (2) that religions concern counterintuitive agents, objects, or events, and 
(3) that the transmission advantage of MCI concepts makes them more likely to be found in the 
world’s religions than other kinds of concepts. These researchers admit that minimal 
counterintuitiveness is not sufficient to make a concept of any religious concern but contend that 
the characteristics that give MCI concepts ‘inferential potential’ are not the ones responsible for 
their transmission advantage. Our findings support the hypothesis that sources of inferential 
potential such as moral valence and existential anxiety are central to the memorability of 
memorable MCI concepts and that without inferential potential MCI concepts will often fail to be 
memorable. We observed that concepts involving norm violations or existential anxieties were 
recalled at higher rates than MCI items that did not involve these concerns.  
 In two of our studies (Studies 2 and 3), recall rates for MCI items trended slightly in the 
direction predicted by Barrett and Boyer but failed to have a large enough effect to achieve 
statistical significance. These trends suggest that with more statistical power a significant main 
effect of minimal counterintuitiveness or significant interaction effects between minimal 
counterintuitiveness and sources of inferential potential might be observed. Nevertheless, at the 
power level used in our studies, we were able to find meaningful effects of sources of inferential 
potential when none were found for minimal counterintuitiveness. 
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 Barrett and Boyer (Barrett & Nyhof, 2001; Boyer & Ramble, 2001) have argued (a) that 
the transmission advantage observed for MCI concepts was not merely an instance of the 
‘bizarreness (or distinctiveness) effect’ in memory (Hirshman, 1988; Hirshman et al., 1989; 
Waddill & McDaniel, 1998), whereby incongruous concepts are remembered better than less 
surprising ones but (b) that minimal counterintuitiveness imparts a special transmission advantage 
to concepts that goes beyond any advantage granted by the distinctive or surprising nature of those 
concepts. Our failure to find a statistically significant effect for minimal counterintuitiveness is 
unfriendly to this hypothesis. Thus, we take our findings to challenge important claims made by 
leading researchers within the cognitive science of religion regarding MCI concepts and to suggest 
some potentially fruitful avenues of future research that further examine and compare the 
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